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DRAFT of August 2019
<
https://www.icloud.com/pages/0v8Wi3dnz8Cj16uyoQN-
pgELw#SYLLABUS-Josiah-Ober
>
Sather Seminar.
Rationality, interests, and choice in Greek thought and practice.
=
CLASSIC 239
(Topics). CCN 31292
Fall term 2019. Wednesday 2-5 pm. Room: DOEL308C
Professor Josiah Ober. jober@stanford.edu
The course explores the role of practical reasoning (in the sense of rational choice-making under
conditions of uncertainty) in the ethical-political works of e.g. Plato and Aristotle, in the
historical-political projects of e.g. Herodotus and Thucydides, and in the design of classical
Greek institutions. We ask to what degree ancient Greeks shared intuitions concerning the
rationality of choice with contemporary decision and game theorists. The Greek tradition
recognized the limits of expected utility maximization in predicting or explaining the actual
behavior of individuals, groups, and states, and sought to explain divergences from predicted
rational behavior. Greek social theorists may, therefore, have shared some of the intuitions of
contemporary ethicists and behavioral economists. Topics will include individual rationality,
rationality of groups and states, the origins of social order, emergence and persistence of
monarchical and democratic regimes, conflict and cooperation in interstate relations,
competition and cooperation in exchange. Examining the Greek tradition of thought on practical
reasoning has some implications for we might think about deliberation and bargaining in
contemporary democratic-political, interpersonal-ethical, and interstate contexts.
PREREQUISITES
: Students in the course are expected to have a background in EITHER classical
studies, OR Greek political thought, OR formal/positive political theory. Registration for
undergraduates is with permission of instructor.
REQUIREMENTS
: One session of discussion leadership with short paper in advance, active
participation in seminar discussions, fi nal research paper.
READINGS
will be from classical Greek texts (readily available in multiple editions and
translations) and from works in Dropbox folder:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/jiqa9d9x3brvogu/AACQs2icHAN5_qMbS7cCvw8xa?dl=0
)
and/or library accessible.
Bold = available on Dropbox
NB:
Ober G&R = draft chapters of the book-in-progress on which my Sather Lectures are based.
“Optional readings” are listed for the convenience of those giving reports/writing papers on the
topic and those requiring more background or wishing to pursue the topic in greater depth.
Dixit and Skeath,
Games of Strategy
, frequently cited in the “optional reading,” is a standard
textbook. Some parts are technical, but most is accessible. The 1st edition (referenced below) is
available in inexpensive used copies from Amazon.com and other re-sellers.
1
Seminar begins
on September 4; please have the background reading for that week done by
then.
1.
September 4. Introduction to course. Formal theories of decision and games. Their use in
humanities, esp. classical studies. Their limits and critics. READ AS BACKGROUND
•
Ferejohn 2009 (
Expectations, Institutions and Rationality
)
•
Charron 2000
(Greeks and Games
).
•
Anderson 2000 (
Beyond
homo economicus
)
Optional Reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (
Games of Strategy
ch. 1: Basic ideas and examples: 1-14),
or similar introductory textbook in game theory
o
Amadae 2016 (
Prisoners of reason: Game theory and neoliberal political
economy
. A very well informed, well written critique of game theory)
o
Buchak 2013 (
Risk and Rationality
: Preface and Introduction)
o
Chwe 2013 (
Jane Austen: Game Theorist
)
o
Banerjee 2018
(Austin Equilibrium
)
o
Miller and Felton 2002 (
Teaching game theory through Greek myths
)
2.
September 11. The rational and the irrational in Greek studies. Sociological and economic
theories of ancient and modern social behavior. READ
•
Homer,
Iliad
, books 1, 19.
•
Dodds 1951 (
The Greeks and the Irrational
.
Preface and Chapter 1, pp. 1-18
)
•
Williams 1993 (
Shame and Necessity
, chs. 1-2
).
•
Murray 1990
(Cities of Reason
)
•
Frede 1996
(Introduction
to
Rationality in Greek Thought
)
•
Barry 1978 (
Sociologists, economists, and democracy
, pp. 1-12, 165-183
)
Optional Reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (ch. 2 How to think about strategic games: 1-38)
o
Smith 2019:
Irrationality: A History of the Dark Side of Reason
(esp. pp. 1-40)
o
Gouldner 1965 (
Enter Plato
)
o
Carugati, Ober, and Weingast 2019
(Is Development Uniquely Modern?
)
o
Mantzavinos 2001 (
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
, chs. 1-4
)
3.
September 18. Some problems with “Greek games.” Chance (uncertainty, probability, risk,
likelihood) and in modern theory and in Greek thought and practice. Ordinal v cardinal
ranking. Completeness and transitivity. READ
•
Plato, Republic, book 4.466a-467e
•
Antiphon
Tetralogy
1
•
Gorgias,
Palamedes
•
Diaconis and Skyrms 2018 (
Great Ideas about Chance
)
ch. 2: 22-48 (Judgment)
•
Franklin 2015 (
Science of Conjecture
) Preface, ch. 1 (
Ancient Law of Proof, 1-11
),
Ch. 5 (
Rhetoric, Logic, Theory, 102-130
). Ch. 6 (
Aristotle’s “not by chance”
argument, 131-134
).
2
•
Obdrzalek 2005 (
on Carneades, esp. section VII: 264-273
)
•
Gagarin 2014 (
eikos
arguments in oratory
).
Optional Reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (Probability and risk: 163-176)
o
Aristotle
Rhetoric
o
Tindale 2010 (
Reason’s Dark Champions
), ch. 6: “What is eikos?”
o
Burnyeat (
Carneades was no probabilist
)
o
Allen 1995 (on
Experts and failure
).
o
Kurke 1999 (ch. 7 Greek games of chance and strategy)
o
Kidd 2017a and 2017b (
JHS
137: 112-134 on dice and astragaloi
)
4.
September 25. Sophistic and philosophical theories of practical reasoning. READ
•
“
Anonymous Iamblichi” (esp. section 6-end) = Loeb vol. 532, Sophists II.
•
Gorgias,
Defense of Helen
•
Plato
Republic
books 1 and 2
•
Herodotus book 1.1-45.
•
Laird 2001 (
Herodotus’ and Plato’s Gyges stories
)
•
Ober G&R chapter 1
Optional Reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (ch. 3. Games with sequential moves: 43-78)
o
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics
book 6 (
prohairesis
and
phronesis
)
o
Tindale 2010 (
Reason’s Dark Champions
pp. 1-43: Introduction
,
chs. 1-3)
o
Chamberlain 1984 (
On Aristotle’s
prohairesis
)
o
Danzig 2008 (
Plato’s Gyges
)
o
Munson 2001 (
Ananke
in Herodotus
)
5.
October 2. The origins of social order. READ
•
Plato,
Republic
(book 2, again)
•
Plato,
Protagoras
317e-378d (“Great Speech”)
•
Plato,
Gorgias
481b-513c (Callicles),
•
Diodorus of Sicily
Library of History
1.8, 1.90 (origins of order)
•
Chung 2016 (
Game-Theoretic Thrasymachus & Glaucon
)
•
Skyrms 2001 (
Stag Hunt
)
•
Ober G&R chapter 2
Optional Reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (ch. 4. Games w/simultaneous moves: 79-118. For more
detail: chs. 8: Prisoner’s dilemma, 10: Evolutionary games, 11: Collective action
games, 12: Uncertainty and information)
o
Plato
, Statesman, Laws
(relevant sections listed in Ober G&R ch. 2).
o
Farrar, Cynthia. 1988.
The origins of democratic thinking: The invention of politics
in classical Athens
. Cambridge (Chapter on Protagoras).
o
Axelrod, Robert M. 1984.
The evolution of cooperation
. New York: Basic Books.
Calvert, Randall L. 1995. “The rational choice theory of social institutions:
3
cooperation, coordination, and communication.” Pp. 216-268 in
Modern Political
Economy: Old Topics, New Directions
, edited by Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric Allen
Hanuschek. Cambridge.
o
McClennen, Edward F. 2001. “The strategy of cooperation.” Pp. 189-208 in
Practical rationality and preference: Essays for David Gauthier
, edited by
Christopher W. Morris, Arthur Ripstein, and David P. Gauthier. Cambridge.
o
Skyrms, Brian. 2000. “Game theory, rationality, and evolution of the social
contract.”
Journal of Consciousness Studies.
7:269-284.
o
North, Wallis, Weingast 2009 (
Violence and Social Orders
)
o
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012 (
Why Nations Fail
)
6.
October 9. The emergence and persistence of absolute and limited monarchies. READ
•
Aristotle,
Politics
(Book 3.14-18 =1284b35-1288b5; 5.5-12 =1304b19-1316b27:
on kingship)
•
Herodotus (Book 1.95-106: Medes; 3.61-88: Persians)
•
Polybius (Book 6.5-7: Origins of moral psychology and legitimate kingship)
•
Straumann 2019 (
on game theoretic Polybius
)
•
Dewald, Carolyn. 2003 (
tyranny in Herodotus
)
•
Riker 1982 (
Liberalism
against
populism
pp.
1-8, 16-19, 119-123
: voting cycles)
•
Ober G&R chapter 3
Optional Reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (Ultimatum Game: 534-36)
o
Pelling 2002 (
on Herodotus on Persian Constitutional Debate
)
o
Evans 1981 (
on historicity of the Persian Debate
)
o
Munson 2009 (
Who are Herodotus’ Persians?)
o
Thomas, Rosalind. 2012. “Herodotus and eastern myths and logoi: Deioces the
Mede and Pythius the Lydian.” Pp. 233-254 in
Myth, truth, and narrative in
Herodotus
, edited by Emily Baragwanath and Mathieu de Bakker. Oxford.
o
Recent survey of voting methods and paradoxes (see esp. section 5): https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/voting-methods/
o
Mackie 2003
Democracy Defended
(against prevalence of voting cycles)
o
Arrow 1963:
Social Choice and Individual Values
(the Impossibility Theorem)
7.
October 16. Citizen constitutions I. Bargaining. READ
•
Plutarch,
Life of Solon
,
•
Aristotle
Politeia
of Athens (sections on Solon)
•
Plutarch
, Life of Lycurgus
.
•
Xenophon
,
Politeia of the Lacedaemonians
•
Barry 1989 (
Theories of Justice
pp. 3-29
)
•
Hardin 1968 (
Tragedy of Commons
)
•
Ostrom et al. 1999 (
Revisiting the Commons
)
•
Ober G&R Chapter 4.
Optional Reading
4
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (Bargaining:
ch. 16: 521-549).
o
Noussia 2006 (Solon and Rhetoric)
o
Harris 2006 (Solon and Law-making)
o
Hodkinson, S. 1983. (
Social Order & Values in Classical Sparta
)
o
Holladay, A.J. 1977. (
Spartan austerity
)
o
Ober and Weingast 2018 (
Sparta Game
)
o
Calvert, Randall L. 1995. “The rational choice theory of social institutions,
cooperation, coordination, and communication.” Pp. 216-267 in
Modern Political
Economy
, edited by Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanuschek. Cambridge.
8.
October 23. Citizen constitutions II. Rational democracy. READ
•
Plato
Republic
(book 8 on timocracy, oligarchy, democracy).
•
Thucydides book 2 (esp. Funeral Oration, Pericles’ second assembly speech, 2.65:
assessment of Pericles)
•
Teegarden 2012
(Oath of Demophantos
).
•
Carugati and Weingast 2018
(Rethinking mass and elite)
•
Canevaro 2019 (
Deliberation at Athens
)
•
Ober G&R Chapter 5
Optional reading.
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (ch. 14. Strategy and voting: 462-489)
o
Ober and Weingast Forthcoming (
Democracy and walls
).
o
Teegarden 2014 (
Death to Tyrants
)
o
Simonton 2017
(Stability and Violence
)
o
Simonton 2017 (
Classical Greek Oligarchy
)
o
Cammack forthcoming (
Deliberation in Greek Assemblies
)
o
Canevaro 2018 (
Majority rule vs consensus
)
o
Sen 2017 (Collective Choice and Social Wefare 2
nd
edition, 1-41)
9.
October 30. Interstate relations. READ
•
Thucydides (book 1.1—1.23, 1.67-78, book 3.1-50, Book 5.84-116)
•
Kahneman 2011: chs. 1, 26-29 (
Thinking fast and slow
: On prospect theory
)
•
Tordoff 2014 (
Thucydides and counterfactuals
)
•
Ober G&R chapter 6
Optional reading
o
Dixit and Skeath 1999 (ch. 9: Games with strategic moves: 288-316)
o
Schelling 1960 on conflict
o
Kahneman and Tversky 1979 (
Prospect Theory
)
o
Buchak 2013 (
Risk and Rationality
: Ch. 1).
o
Myerson 2009 (
on Schelling
)
o
Lebow and Strauss 1991 (
Hegemonic Rivalry
: Realist IR theory and Thucydides)
o
Lebow 2003 (
Tragic vision
: Chapter on Thucydides)
o
Dal Borgo thesis on “Thucydides: father of game theory” (abstract):
http://
discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1507820/
5
o
Morley 2019 (Melian Dilemma game):
https://epoiesen.library.carleton.ca/
2019/02/06/the-melian-dilemma-remaking-thucydides/
10.
November 6. Exchange, contracts, friendship. Critical ethics. READ
•
Plato,
Republic
books 1&2
(yet again: esp. Socrates with Cephalus and
Polemarchus; First Polis/City of Pigs)
•
Iliad
books 1, 19 (again)
•
Xenophon,
Memorabilia
book 3;
Oikonomikos
,
Poroi
•
Aristotle
Politics
book 1 (esp. chs. 1, 3, 8-11); book 2 (esp. ch. 1-6)
•
Aristotle
NE
, books 5 (Justice, esp. chs. 5, 10), 8, 9 (Friendship)
•
Mackil 2017 (
Property and limits
)
•
Ober G&R chapter 7
Optional Reading
o
Finley 1963 (Generalizations in Ancient History; reprinted in Finley
1975 Use and
Abuse of History
)
o
Finley 1999 [1973] (
The Ancient Economy
, with introduction by Ian Morris and
critical
review by M. Frederiksen 1975 in
JRS
)
o
Scheidel, Morris, and Saller 2007
(Introduction to
Cambridge Economic History
of the Greco-Roman World
)
o
Bresson 2017 (
Making of the Ancient Greek Economy
)
o
Harris., Lewis, and Woolmer, ed. 2015. (
The Ancient Greek Economy
: esp.
Introduction)
o
Ober 2015 (
Rise and Fall of Classical Greece
: esp.
Ch. 1 Introduction
, ch. 5)
11.
November 13. Rationality of ends and means.
Eudaimonia
. (Further Reading TBA)
•
Plato,
Republic
book 9 (justice and rationality of ends)
•
Aristotle
NE
books 6 (
Phronesis
), 7 (chs. 11-14: Pleasure), 10 (Pleasure,
Eudaimonia
)
November 14 – Dec. 3: students work on papers.
12.
December 4. Presentation of preliminary fi ndings in student papers.
6
